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PEOPLE EX REL. STAMOS v. JONES:
A RESTRAINT ON LEGISLATIVE REVISION

OF
THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT RULES
The proposition that the Illinois courts possess the power to
adopt court rules for the regulation of practice and procedure is
firmly established in the judicial history of Illinois., This proposition is not unique to Illinois, for common law courts had traditionally adopted court rules in order to regulate proceedings
and facilitate the administration of justice.2
Although the rule-making function is firmly established, its
history in a government operating under a system of separation
of powers is characterized by considerable uncertainty regarding
the source of the rule-making power of the judiciary and legislature.
Furthermore, a degree of unpredictability still exists
where court rules and statutory provisions on the same procedural matters conflict. 4 Amidst this perplexity regarding the
locus of responsibility for procedural regulation, one proposition
remains certain: courts have no power to adopt rules which
violate constitutional provisions or substantive law. 5 Thus, the
rule-making power of the judiciary is necessarily limited to mat6
ters strictly procedural in nature.
HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF JUDICIAL-LEGISLATIVE
INTERACTION IN PROCEDURAL REGULATION

As has been stated, there is firm support for the proposition
1 E.g., People v. Lobb, 17 Ill. 2d 287, 161 N.E.2d 325 (1960); People
ex rel. Bernat v. Bicek, 405 Ill.
510, 91 N.E.2d 588 (1950) ; Biggs v. Spader,
411 Ill. 42, 103 N.E.2d 104 (1952) ; Gyure v. Sloan Valve Co., 367 Ill. 489,
11 N.E.2d 963 (1938) ; Wilson v. Gill, 279 Ill.
App. 487 (1935) ; Robbins v.
Campbell, 65 Ill.
App. 2d 478, 213 N.E.2d 641 (1965).
"Gertner, The Inherent Power of Courts To Make Rules, 10 U. CIN.
L. REV. 32 (1936). See Hoffman v. Paradis, 259 Ill. 111, 102 N.E. 253
(1913), wherein the court defined practice and procedure as:
...that which regulates the formal steps in an action or other judicial
proceeding; 'those legal rules which direct the course of proceedings to
bring parties into the court and the course of the court after they are
brought in.'
Id. at 112-13, 102 N.E. at 254.
Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599 (1926);
Joinder, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making,
55 MICH. L. REV. 623, 624 (1957).
4Note, The Rule-Makingq Powers of the Illinois Supreme Court, 1965
U. ILL. L.F. 903. See also Terrell, The Rule-Making Power of the Florida
Supreme Court: The Twilight Zone Between Substance and Procedure, 24
U. FLA. L. REV. 87 (1971).
5Joiner, note 3 supra at 629.
6See also Doherty, Total Pretrial Disclosure to the State: A Requiem
to the Accusatorial System, 60 ILL. B. J. 534, 540 (1972).
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that the judiciary possesses the power to regulate practice and
procedure through the medium of court rules. Practice and
procedure in the common law courts of England was generally
regulated by rules of court7 and by the time the common law
was introduced into this country, it had become customary for
the judiciary to regulate practice and procedure by rule.,
More immediate to the development of the rule-making
power in Illinois is the Ordinance of 1787 which provided that
the common law would be in force throughout the Northwest
Territory.9 It follows that the courts established pursuant to the
Ordinance of 1787 must be deemed to have possessed the customary powers of the common law courts, one of which was the
power to regulate practice and procedure. Notwithstanding the
existence of this rule-making power, the territorial period from
1787 to 1818 was characterized by considerable legislation on
procedural matters.10
The Judicial Article of the Constitution of 1818 provided
that "[T]he judicial power of this state shall be vested in one
supreme court, and such inferior courts as the general assembly
shall, from time to time, ordain and establish.",' The term

"court" was not defined, nor was reference made to the rule-

making power of the judiciary.

Since the judicial power was

vested in the "courts" and the term "court" was not defined by
the Constitution of 1818, incorporation by reference1 2 demands
that the term be deemed to carry with it all the powers which

"courts" possessed the instant before the instrument incorporating that term became effective, except where otherwise provided by that constitution. The instant prior to the effective
7

Pound, note 3 supra at 601.

COURTS OF KINGS

]BENCH

AND

See also 1 TIDD, THE PRACTICE OF THE
COMMON PLEAS at xxxviii (7th ed. 1821).

In his list of procedural rules of court, Tidd lists the earliest rule of the
Court of Common Pleas as having been adopted in 1457.
8 Pound, note 3 supra at 601.
9 See note a to An Act of August 7, 1789, ch. VIII, 1 STAT. 50. One of
the articles of compact between the original states and the Territory and
eventually the states arising within the Territory was that of "judicial
proceedings according to the course of the common law." Id. at 52. See
also Zacharias, The Illinois Courts Pqior to Statehood, 56 Ill. B. J. 556
(1968).
10 Act of May 18, 1792, ch. 36, 1 STAT. 275. The legislature also directed
the courts to adopt rules of practice in "An Act Regulating and Defining
the Duties of the United States Judges for the Territory of Illinois," § 19,
1816-17 Laws, Ill. Terr. 37.
11ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1818).
12 Incorporation by reference is a rule of construction which has found
application in two situations. First, with respect to documents, incorporation
by reference is the method of making one document of any kind become a
part of another separate document by referring to the former in the latter,
and declaring that the former shall be taken and considered as a part of the
latter the same as if it were fully set out therein. Secondly, with respect to
terms and phrases, incorporation by reference operates to grant an undefined
word or phrase the meaning and effect which obtained to the term or phrase
antecedent to its use in the instant document. The reference may be ex-
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date of the Constitution of 1818, the courts possessed the customary powers of the common law courts under the authority
of the Ordinance of 1787, including the power to regulate practice and procedure through the adoption of general rules of
practice. Thus it is clear that through incorporation by reference the courts created pursuant to the mandate of article IV,
section I of the Constitution of 1818 must be deemed to have
possessed rule-making power with the constitution as the source.
The legislative role in the regulation of practice and procedure had become established prior to statehood. Pursuant to
the constitution, the courts clearly possessed rule-making power
through incorporation by reference. Thus, the basis was formed
for considerable controversy between court rules and statutes
regulating procedure in a government operating under a system
of separation of powers.
DEVELOPMENT OF A JUDICIAL ATTITUDE CONCERNING
JUDICIAL-LEGISLATIVE INTERACTION

The Subordinate Status of Court Rules
The existence of an inherent rule-making power in the judiciary was recognized by the Illinois Supreme Court at an early
-date,"3 but court rules were never accorded the level of independent status which inescapably follows from the exercise of power
vested in an independent branch of government. An early illustration of this judicial attitude was manifest in Owens v.
Ranstead,14 wherein the court indicated that judicially created
rules of practice and procedure must be consistent with statutory
enactments. Owens and other early cases15 espousing this caveat
are not surprising historically, especially in light of the active
legislative role during the territorial period. Moreover, when
significant procedural reforms were initiated during the 19th
century, the legislature took the active role. As a consequence of
this early legislative initiative and the then prevalent doctrine of
"legislative supremacy," the rule-making power of the judiciary
was often treated as subordinate to the legislature's by the courts
themselves.press or implied and may be to a statute, constitution, any other document,
or the common law.
'3 Wallbaum v. Haskins, 49 Ill. 313
(1868); Mix v. Chandler, 44 Ill.
174 (1867) ; Prindeville v. People, 42 111. 217 (1866) ; Holloway v. Freeman,
22 Ill. 197 (1859).
14 22 Ill. 161 (1859).
15 Note 13 supra.
1 Comment, The Inherent Power of Courts To Formulate Rules of
Practice, 29 ILL. L. REV. 911, 913 (1935); Pound, note 3 supra; Trumbull,
Judicial Responsibility for Regulating Practice and Procedure in Illinois, 47
Nw. U.L. REv. 443, 447 (1952); Southerland, The Exercise of the Rule

3'eople ex rel: 5tanios v. Jones
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The status of court rules and their relationship to conflicting,
procedural statutes was further complicated by a history of legislative enactments which purported to confer, grant, or delegate
rule-making power upon the Illinois Supreme Court. An example
of such legislation was the Civil Practice Act of 1933, which provided that "[T] he Supreme Court of this State shall have power
to make rules of pleading, practice, and procedure . . . but not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act . . . . ",i7 This legislation, insofar as it purported to vest the court with rule-making
power, was unnecessary. The supreme court possessed the power
through incorporation by reference with the constitution as the
source."' This theory was clearly enunciated in Hanna v. Mitchell, 9 in 1922.
In Hanna, the New York Court of Appeals held that notwithstanding the existence of enabling legislation, "[T] he power
to make rules governing the practice and procedure in the courts
is a judicial, and not a legislative, power. ' 20 This conclusion was
supported through analysis of the historical development of the
rule-making power. Specifically, the court pointed out that the
rule-making power in the English Courts of Kings Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer was considered inherent; that the common law of England was adopted in New York, and that the supreme court created pursuant thereto possessed and exercised the
rule-making power. In short, the court applied the doctrine of
incorporation by reference. Having found support in the longstanding exercise of the power by the judiciary before the state
legislature was created, the court concluded that legislation purporting to vest the court with rule-making power constituted a
mere "legislative recognition" of a power already possessed by
2
the judiciary. '
Notwithstanding the doctrine of incorporation by reference
and cases decided on grounds similar to those in Hanna v.
Mitchell, courts have held such enabling legislation to be a constitutionally permissible delegation of power; the theory being
that the rule-making power is judicial as well as legislative. 22
This theory, however, necessarily defends the subordinate status
to which court rules have often been relegated, as it obscures
Making Power, 12 A.B.A.J. 548 (1926); Tyler, The Origin of the Rule
Making Power and Its Exercise by Legislatures, 22 A.B.A.J. 772-73 (1936).
17 No. 359, [1933]
Ill. Laws, 58th Sess. 784, art. 1, § 2, as amended

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, art. 1, § 2 (1971)
18 Note 12 supra.

(emphasis added).

19202 App. Div. 504, 196 N.Y.S. 43 (1922), aff'd 235 N.Y. 534, 139 N.E.
724 (1923).
20 Id. at 513, 196 N.Y.S. at 51.
21

Id.

Accord, In re Constitutionality of Section 251.18, Wisconsin Statutes,
204 Wis. 501, 236 N.W. 717 (1931) ; See Annot., 110 A.L.R. 28 (1937) ; 158
A.L.R. 707 (1945).
22
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the source of the rule-making power. It is apparent that if a
court rule be deemed the product of an exercise of power received
through legislative grant, it could not be accorded a status superior to a conflicting procedural statute, except where the legislature so provides. Moreover, the continued possession of the
power by the courts would be subject to the will of the legislature which could revoke the power at any23 time, or nullify an
undesirable court rule by subsequent statute.. .
Source of Legislative Power To Adopt Procedural Statutes
The postulate that the legislature possesses a valid power to
directly regulate matters strictly procedural in nature is fundamental to any policy or theory whereby court rules are relegated
to a status subordinate to conflicting procedural statutes. The
validity of this presupposition may depend upon constitutional
interpretation, because the power to regulate practice and procedure may be arguably one which is not "peculiarly and intrinsically" vested in either the legislature or judiciary.
In re Constitutionality of Section 251.18, Wisconsin Statutes, 24 involved the Wisconsin Supreme Court's consideration of
the constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute purporting to vest
rule-making power in the supreme court. The principal contention, unlike that in Hanna, was that the statute constituted
an impermissible delegation of legislative power to the court.
The supreme court rejected this contention, holding that the
power to regulate procedure was essentially judicial, and that
delegation to the courts was constitutionally permissible.
Important in the Wisconsin case, as distinct from Hanna, is
the unchallenged assumption that the legislature possessed a
valid power to regulate procedure. In order to sustain the enabling statute, it was necessary to determine that the power to
regulate practice and procedure was not so "peculiarly and intrinsically legislative" that the separation of powers doctrine
would preclude delegation of rule-making power to the courts.
To accomplish this objective, it was cardinal to the Wisconsin
decision to find that the power to regulate procedure is "essentially judicial," for such a determination would obviate any contention that the legislature was attempting to abdicate its lawmaking function. However, the assumption of a valid legislative power to regulate procedure, coupled with the determination
that the power is "essentially judicial," results in the existence
of concurrent power to regulate procedure. This result is not
offensive to the doctrine of separation of powers, so long as the
23 Hall, Judicial Rule-Making Is Alive but Ailing, 55 A.B.A.J. 637, 639
(1969).
24 204 Wis. 501, 236 N.W. 717 (1931).
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doctrine is not scientifically applied, and it is concluded that the
power is not "peculiarly and intrinsically" vested in either branch
of government.
The process whereby the Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that the power to regulate procedure is essentially judicial is of particular interest when considering the nature of that
power in Illinois. The Wisconsin court emphasized that "[T]he
question as to what powers are essentially judicial and what legislative is to be solved by ascertaining the definition and scope
of such power at the time the Constitution was adopted." - An
analysis of the leading "court rule" cases in Illinois will illustrate that the Illinois Supreme Court also formulated its concepts
concerning the nature of the rule-making power through historical analysis of the nature of the power and varied constructions of the separation of powers provision of the constitution.
The Rule-making Controversy in Illinois
In People v. Kelly2 6 it was contended that since the judicial
powers were vested in the courts by the constitution, the legislature could not control the exercise of these powers and that
such control would violate the separation of powers.2 7 The court
rejected this all inclusive contention on the theory that the doctrine of separation of powers "is the declaration of a fundamental principle and, though of vital importance, is to be understood as the broad theoretical line of demarcation between the
great departments of government. ' 2 In essence, the court refused a literal application of the separation provision.
Having determined that regulation of procedure by statute
did not violate the separation of powers, the Kelly court indicated that the source of this legislative power was constitutional,
supporting this proposition by citing section 22 of article IV of
the Constitution of 1870, which provided that:
The General Assembly shall not pass local or special laws in
any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say: For ...
regulating the practice in courts of justice; . . . In all other
cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special laws
shall be enacted.
The court found further support in section 29 of article VI which
provided:
All laws relating to courts shall be general, and of uniform operation; and the organization, jurisdiction, powers, proceedings
and practice of all courts, of the same class or grade, so far as
regulated by law, and the force and effect of the process, judgments and decrees of such courts, severally, shall be uniform.
25 Id. at 505, 236 N.W. at 718.
26347 Ill. 221, 179 N.E. 898 (1932).
27 ILL. CONST.art. III (1870).
28 347 Ill. at 235, 179 N.E. at 903.
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The Kelly court theorized that the presence of these provisions
pertaining to the uniformity of laws governing practice and procedure necessitated the implication that the legislature possesses
a constitutional power to regulate procedure by statute.
The theory upon which Kelly sustained the legislature's role
was justifiable in light of the court's refusal to undertake a literal or scientific application of the separation of powers provision. That section provided that before one department could
exercise powers properly belonging to another, such an exercise
must be "expressly directed or permitted" by the constitution. 29
Thus, using a broad theoretical line of demarcation coupled with
the constitutional language quoted above, the Kelly court had no
difficulty deriving constitutional authority for regulation of procedure by statute.
Two years later, in People v. Callopy,30 the Illinois Supreme
Court implemented the same analysis employed in the Wisconsin
case, and intimated that the power to regulate procedure more
closely approaches one which is "peculiarly and intrinsically"
judicial rather than one which is "essentially" judicial. The
precise question in Callopy was whether or not the power to
make rules was to be considered a power vested in the courts by
the constitution by virtue of the broad grant of "judicial
power. 13, The Callopy court concluded that since the power to
regulate practice and procedure was considered to be a "judicial
power" at common law, the same rule-making power must be
considered to have been vested in the supreme court by the constitution.
Later, in Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 32 the power of the
legislature was again the subject of controversy, but the theory
of the Agran court also reflected A substantial change in judicial
attitude from that expressed in Kelly. The Agran court capitalized upon the historical analysis of Callopy, pointing out that
although "judicial power" is not defined by the constitution,
nevertheless, the constitution vests "judicial power" in its entirety in the courts; that "[I]f the power is judicial in nature, it
necessarily follows that the legislature is expressly prohibited
from exercising it."2' 3 The court emphasized that "[T]he General Assembly has the power to enact laws governing judicial
practice only where they do not unduly infringe upon the inherent
powers of the judiciary, ' 3 4 without attempting to justify its position by postulating theories as to the source of this legislative
Note 27 supra.
30 358 Ill.
11, 192 N.E. 634 (1934).
11 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (1870).
29

32412
3
34

11. 145, 105 N.E.2d 713 (1952).

Id. at 149, 105 N.E.2d at 715.

Id.
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power. Rather, it intimated that while it has become customary
to recognize a limited legislative power to regulate procedure, the
source of this legislative power is uncertain, and its exercise constitutes a "usurpation" of judicial power.3
Callopy and Agran represented a culmination of all the elements of a changed judicial attitude concerning the matter of
court rules. With the decision in Agran it was apparent that
the court considered the responsibility for regulating matters
strictly procedural to be vested in the court and that unauthorized statutory regulation of such matters constituted a usurpation of judicial power. Significantly, the Civil Practice Act
was amended in light of Callopy and subsequent cases, giving
full recognition to the supreme court's expressions that the rulemaking power is inherent in the judiciary and does not exist by
36
virtue of legislative grant.
Against this background of history and decisional law, the
controversy in People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones 7 was presented to
the Illinois Supreme Court in an original petition for a writ of
mandamus.
THE STAMOS DECISION
The controversy in Stamos had its genesis in an amendment
to the Code of Criminal Procedure which conflicted with a court
rule on the same procedural matter. The statute, in relevant
part, provided as follows:
If an appeal is taken from a judgment or order on an offense other
than a 'forcible felony,' and the defendant is admitted to bail, the
sentence of imprisonment shall be stayed by the trial court. If an
appeal is taken from a judgment or order on an offense defined as
a 'forcible felony' the defendant shall not be entitled to a continuasentence of imprisonment shall not be
tion of his bail and the
38
stayed by the trial court.
The Illinois Supreme Court, prior to the enactment of the
above statute, adopted a court rule which provided that upon appeal from a judgment sentencing a defendant to imprisonment,
"[T] he defendant may be admitted to bail and the sentence..
3
stayed by a judge of the trial or reviewing court.
On September 12, 1967, the Honorable Sidney A. Jones, the
defendant in Stamos, found one Major McNeal guilty of two
charges of aggravated battery and sentenced him to imprison35
Id.
36
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2(1) (1967) provides in part that "[T]he
Supreme Court of this State has power to make rules of pleading, practice
and procedure .... " (emphasis added).

Ill. 2d 62, 237 N.E.2d 495 (1968).
Law of Sept. 5, 1967, ch. 38, § 121-6 [1967J Ill. Laws 75 (repealed
1969) (emphasis added).
39 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 609(b) (1967) (emphasis added).
3740
38
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ment in the penitentiary for a term of years. When a bond in
the amount of $5,000 was filed, Judge Jones admitted MeNeal
to bail.
Since McNeal was found guilty of aggravated battery, a
forcible felony, section 1.21-6 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure would have precluded the admission of McNeal to bail;
while under rule 609 (b) the admission to bail would have been
subject to the sound discretion of the judge. The court resolved
the conflict between section 121-6 (b) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure and rule 609 (b) by appealing to the provisions of the
Judicial Article of 1962.40
The Judicial Article of 1962 made special reference to the
rule-making authority of the supreme court in particular instances. 41 The Stanos court observed that of the five references
to the rule-making function contained in sections 2, 5, and 7,
there was but one instance wherein the constitution expressly
stated that the exercise of the rule-making power was "subject
to law hereafter enacted." ' That particular reference concerned
the matter of direct appeal from the circuit court to the supreme
court. The court concluded that inasmuch as the constitution
expressly subjected court rules to legislative enactments only in
matters of direct appeal, it was only with respect to those matters that the General Assembly was authorized by article VI to
revise rules adopted by the supreme court. The court held that
since the constitution provided that "[T] he Supreme Court shall
provide by rule for expeditious and inexpensive appeals . . .,,4without any qualification subjecting such rules to "law hereafter
enacted," it must be concluded that the constitution vested responsibility for rules governing appeals in the supreme court
and not in the legislature. 4" Thus, since the legislature exceeded
its authority, section 121-6 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as amended, was declared unconstitutional.
Although the decision in Stamos was limited strictly to the
matter of regulating appeals, its significance lies in the court's
assertion of an exclusive rule-making power in the supreme
court over a particular facet of procedure. The court's analysis
of its rule-making power pursuant to the new article VI (Judicial Article adopted in 1962) of the Illinois Constitution of 1870,
is especially significant in accounting for this assertion of
exclusive responsibility for rules governing appeals.
The Judicial Article of 1962, unlike prior judicial articles,
40

41

ILL. CONST.

art. VI (1870).

Id. §§ 2, 5, 7.

42 I. § 5.
4. id. § 7.
44 Note 37 supra at 66, 237 N.E.2d at 498.
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expressly recognized a rule-making power in particular instances.- Although the Stamos court focused particularly upon
these "express references," its decision did not proceed from any
significant constitutional changes effected by their inclusion in
the Judicial Article. The court noted that "[T]hese provisions do
not suggest an intention to effect a general revision of the rulemaking power of this court as it existed prior to the adoption of
article VI."''
Thus, since the Judicial Article of 1962 did not
effect a general revision of the rule-making power, it must be
concluded that the shift in judicial policy manifest in Slamos
proceeded from the development of a judicial attitude concerning
the relationship between the judicial and the legislative powers to
regulate matters strictly procedural in nature. In implementing
the concepts expressed in Callopy and Agran, the court cited
Agran in reference to its statement that the express references to
the rule-making power contained in the Judicial Article of 1962
were not intended to change the general rule-making power from
that which had existed prior thereto.'" The court was simply emphasizing that the characterization of the rule-making power
developed in Agran remained viable and controlling under the
Judicial Article of 1962.
The above analysis clearly illustrates that the significance
of Stamos can be more fully appreciated from the historical perspective of legislative-judicial interaction in procedural regulation. Historical analysis of the development of the rule-making
power demonstrates not only that the Stamos court could have
declared an exclusive judicial power to regulate appeals in the
absence of the express reference to the power contained in section 7 of the Judicial Article of 1962, but also that the same
analysis could be utilized with respect to court rules generally.
The Stamos decision, significant in its assertion of the
supremacy of judicially created rules of practice and procedure
in the event of conflict with a procedural statute, must nevertheless be viewed within the limited context of "conflict situations."
The court did not declare that all statutes regulating judicial
procedure are constitutionally void in the absence of express
45Note 41 supra.
46 40 Ill.
2d at 65, 237 N.E.2d at 497.
47See ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 2, Historical and Practice Notes (S.H.A.
1967), which comments on the disputes which arose concerning the rulemaking power at the time the Judicial Article of 1962 was adopted. Many
of the ambiguities which have surrounded the relationship between court
rules and statutes and the power of the legislature to regulate procedure
by statute could have been clarified when the Judicial Article was adopted
in 1962. However, as the Historical and Practice Notes indicate, conflict
on these matters could not be resolved and the much needed clarification did

not result. The adoption of the Judicial Article of 1962 did not effect a
change in the general rule-making power of the courts.
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constitutional authorization, nor did it overrule those prior decisions recognizing a limited power in the General Assembly to
regulate procedure by statute. The traditionally recognized
legislative power to regulate procedure within a limited context
remains unaffected by Stamos, in the absence of conflict with a
court rule, so long as the particular procedural statute is not
repugnant to an express constitutional provision.
STATUS OF THE RULE-MAKING POWER PURSUANT TO THE

CONSTITUTION OF 1970
The Judicial Article of the 1970 Constitution did not effect
a general revision of the rule-making power. However, in making its proposals, the Judiciary Committee emphasized the necessity of affirmative judicial action in order to effectuate the
intended centralized administration and supervision of the
judicial system. 4 Article VI, sections 4, 6, and 16 are especially
significant in regard to centralized administration and supervision.
Article VI, section 4 (b) provides:
Appeals from judgments of Circuit Courts imposing a sentence of death shall be directly to the Supreme Court as a matter
of right. The Supreme
Court shall provide by rule for direct ap49
peal in other cases.
The last sentence of subpart (b) vests an exclusive rule-making
power in the supreme court within the limitations contained
therein. In conjunction with this proposed subpart, the Judiciary Committee emphasized that the supreme court should have
complete discretion and control over direct appeals, exclusive
of death sentence cases, and that the court could more effectively execute its responsibilities as a supreme court if it were
vested with such control over direct appellate jurisdiction. 0
Article VI, section 4 (c), regulating appeals from the appellate court to the supreme court, provides:
Appeals from the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court are a
matter of right if a question under the Constitution of the United
States or of this State arises for the first time in and as a result of
the action of the Appellate Court, or if a division of the Appellate
Court certifies that a case decided by it involves a question of
such importance that the case should be decided by the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court may provide by rule for appeals from
the Appellate Court in other cases. 51
As witnessed in subpart (b), the last sentence of section 4 (c)
vests exclusive rule-making power in the supreme court to pro48

REC. OF PRoc., SIXTH ILL. CONST. CONY., Committee Proposals,vol.

at 812-27 (1969-70).

49 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b)
50 Note 48 supra at 816-17.
51 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 4(c)

(1970)

(emphasis added).

(1970)

(emphasis added).

VI
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vide for appeals to the supreme court from the appellate court in
situations other than those specified therein, where appeal to the
supreme court lies as a matter of right.
Article VI, section 6 also provides an exclusive rule-making
power in the supreme court within the limitations contained
therein. Section 6 provides that "The Supreme Court may provide by rule for appeals to the Appellate Court from other than
'
final judgments of Circuit Courts. 52
The Judiciary Committee emphasized that vesting exclusive
rule-making authority in the supreme court within the limitations contained in sections 4 and 6 was not intended to affect
"the existing constitutional status of the Legislative and Judicial
Departments in respect to the general subject of rule making
power in matters of practice and procedure." 53 The committee,
commenting upon the "existing constitutional status" of the rulemaking power, referred specifically to the concurrent power relationship between the legislature and judiciary. Significantly,
the committee noted, citing Agran and Stamos, that
[W]here there has been on occasion a conflict between the legislative enactment and a Supreme Court Rule in areas where the legislative power is not constitutionally established or where the Court
believes it has an inherent judicial power, the Supreme Court has
held that the rule takes precedence over the statute.Article VI, section 16 provides in part that:
General administrative and supervisory authority over all
courts is vested in the Supreme Court and shall be exercised by the
Chief Justice in accordance with its rules. The Supreme Court
55
shall provide by rule for expeditious and inexpensive appeals.
The framers added the words "and supervisory," emphasizing
that this addition more fully expressed their intention "that the
general authority over all courts vested in the Supreme Court
covers both administrative and supervisory powers."," Although
the last sentence of section 16, as construed in Stamos, vests exclusive responsibility in the supreme court for promulgating
rules governing appeals, the section was not intended to modify
the concurrent power relationship between the legislature and
57
judiciary on the matter of court rules generally.
Although the Constitution of 1970 did not effect a substantial revision of the concurrent power relationship, it should be
emphasized that the constitution contains no express provision
which would preclude the supreme court from determining that
Id. § 6 (emphasis added).
53 Note 48 supra at 825.
54
Id.
55
ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 16 (1970)
52

56 Note 48 supra at 814.
5 See ILL. CONST. art.

1971).

(emphasis added).

VI, § 16, Constitutional Commentary (S.H.A.
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the judiciary possesses an exclusive rule-making power over
facets of procedure not expressly vested therein. As this analysis has indicated, the propriety of legislative control over matters
strictly procedural emanates more directly from custom or tradition than from constitutional authority.
CONCLUSION

Historical analysis clearly illustrates the traditional role
of the judiciary in the regulation of practice and procedure by
rule. Although such an analysis, coupled with a literal application of the separation of powers doctrine, could lead to the conclusion that the judicial power in this regard is exclusive, the
Illinois Supreme Court has not been disposed to so conclude.
Rather, the court has recognized a limited legislative power to
regulate procedure, although its source is not clearly established.
The decision in Stamos is significant in that it focuses upon the
dilemma which arises out of conflict between court rules and
statutes, a natural outgrowth of the concurrent power relationship in the absence of clearly defined boundaries. Although
Stamos was limited to the matter of regulating appeals, the
principles operative therein could be utilized with respect to
court rules generally in similar future conflict situations.
The status of the rule-making power pursuant to the Constitution of 1970 remains substantially unchanged, with the exception of certain enumerated instances in which the power is
exclusively judicial. The framers particularly emphasized that a
general revision of the long-standing concurrent power relationship between the legislature and judiciary regarding procedural
regulation was not intended. Thus, in light of the Constitution of
1970, and within the exceptions enumerated therein, it may be
concluded that the power to regulate practice and procedure is
possessed concurrently by the legislature and judiciary. However,
Stamos may still be viewed as authority for the proposition that
in situations of conflict between a legislative enactment and a
supreme court rule and where the power of the legislature in the
particular instance cannot be constitutionally established, the
rule takes precedence.
Ed Legner

